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 TEACHING SLAVERY IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
by 
 Paul Finkelman* 
From 1787 until the Civil War, slavery was probably the single most important economic 
institution in the United States.  On the eve of the Civil War, slave property was worth at least two 
billion dollars.1  In the aggregate, the value of all the slaves in the United States exceeded the total value 
of all the nations railroads or all its factories.  Slavery led to two major political compromises of the 
antebellum period,2 as well as to the most politically divisive Supreme Court decision in our history.3  
Vast amounts of political and legal energy went into dealing with the institution.  It was a central issue at 
the Constitutional Convention in 1787,4 and remained at the center of much of American politics until 
after the Civil War.  Slavery was the root cause of the Civil War itself, and the eradication of slavery led 
to the adoption of three constitutional Amendments,5 which in many ways remade the Constitution.  
Finally, slavery shaped many of the key decisions of the 19th century and led to the creation of doctrine 
                         
*Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.  I thank Elizabeth Reilly, Stephen 
Gottlieb, Michael Kent Curtis, and Sanford Levinson for their many helpful comments and suggestions on this article. 
 I would also like to thank Kathy Kane and Toni Forrester of the University of Tulsa Law Library for their research 
support. 
1 This estimate is based on an average value of $500 for the approximately 4,000,000 slaves in the United States.  This 
estimate is probably on the low side. 
 
2 The Missouri Compromise, passed in 1820, and the Compromise of 1850. 
 
3 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 
4 Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. 
REV. 423,424 (1999) [hereinafter Finkelman, Affirmative Action]; PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS:  RACE 
AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (1996) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, SLAVERY]. 
 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
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 2 
that continues to affect modern Constitutional law today. 
Despite the importance of slavery to the development of the United States, and to the shaping of 
our Constitution -- both during and after the Convention of 1787 -- slavery is rarely mentioned, or is 
mentioned only in passing, in most Constitutional Law courses.  This approach to Constitutional law 
leads to a skewed and incomplete understanding of how the American Constitution developed during its 
first century.  
I.  WHY TEACH SLAVERY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW? 
At the onset, let me spell out why we ought to teach slave cases in Constitutional Law.  I will 
elaborate on these points throughout this essay.   
1:  Slavery was a central issue at the Constitutional Convention.6  Many clauses in the 
Constitution were fully or partially included in the document to accommodate or protect slavery.  Some 
clauses, such as the Three-fifths Clause,7 the protection of the African slave trade until at least 1808,8 
and the Fugitive Slave Clause,9 were obviously written with slavery in mind.  Other clauses, such as the 
bans on export taxes,10 were less obviously tied to slavery, but were in fact written solely to 
accommodate the demands of slave state delegates.  Still other clauses, such as the Insurrections 
                         
6 See Finkelman, Affirmative Action, supra  note 4, at 424; FINKELMAN, SLAVERY, supra  note 4. 
 
7 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  This clause is often misunderstood to have required an end to the slave trade.  In fact, 
the clause merely prohibited Congress from ending the trade before 1808.  Many delegates in 1787 assumed that, by 
1808, the deep South would have had the political clout to protect the slave trade for the future.  For more discussion 
of this, see Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE J. L. & HUM. 
(forthcoming 2001). 
 
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
 
10 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, §10. 
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Clause,11 the Domestic Violence Clause,12 and the provisions for the election of the president by the 
electoral college,13 were heavily influenced by the needs of the slave south, but were supported for other 
reasons as well.  The Insurrections Clause, for example, guaranteed that federal troops could be called 
out to suppress slave rebellions, but it could also be used to suppress other kinds of insurrections not 
involving slavery.  In teaching Constitutional Law, it seems useful to start with a discussion of how the 
Constitution came to be framed.  Part of that framing centers on how slavery affected the final 
document. 
2:  Federalism, as it developed in the 19th century and as it has evolved since, was greatly 
influenced by slavery.  Some aspects of Constitutional law, including the notion of state police powers 
and the preemption doctrine, were deeply rooted in slavery.  So too, was much of the fear of a central 
government that led to the enactment of the Tenth Amendment.  Obviously states’ rights theory, as it 
developed in the 19th century and as it has been used ever since, was deeply rooted in debates over 
slavery.  As early as 1790, southern states began to articulate claims of states' rights in controversies 
                                                                               
 
11 U.S. CONST., art. I,  § 8, cl. 15. 
 
12 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 
13 U.S. CONST. art. II.  During a debate over how to choose the president, James Madison argued that "the people at 
large" were "the fittest" to choose the president.  2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 56 (Max 
Farrand ed., rev. ed., 1966).  But "one difficulty . . .of a serious nature" made election by the people impossible.  Id. at 
57.  Madison noted that the "right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States, and 
the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes."  Id.  In order to guarantee that the 
non-voting slaves could nevertheless influence the presidential election, Madison favored the creation of the 
electoral college.  Id.  Hugh Williamson of North Carolina was more open about the reasons for southern opposition.  
Id. at 32.  He noted that under a direct election of the president, Virginia would not be able to elect her leaders 
president because "her slaves will have no suffrage."  Id. 
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involving slavery.14  By the end of the antebellum period, both southern and northern states had made 
assertions of states’ rights in the context of slavery.15  Modern states’ rights arguments, sometimes 
framed in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, are often a recycling of these older arguments relating to 
slavery.  Similarly, much of our modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, including such important 
concepts as the dormant Commerce Clause and the state police powers exception to federal commerce 
power, developed, at least in part, because of slavery.  Thus, in the antebellum period slavery was often 
the connecting link between Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the development of states' rights 
theory.  Because we live with the results of this linkage, it is important for students to see and fully 
understand the linkage. 
3:  The Civil War Amendments16 were, of course, the direct result of slavery.  It is imperative to 
teach something about slave law, and even the substance of slavery, to understand them.  We cannot 
understand what was abolished by Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment without some knowledge of 
slavery.  The Supreme Court acknowledges that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of 
badges of slavery.17  But how can students understand what a "badge of slavery" is unless they 
                         
14 See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY supra  note 4, at 80-104 (discussing at length a controversy between Virginia and 
Pennsylvania over the extradition of persons accused of kidnapping a free black).  This controversy led to the 
adoption of the first federal extradition law and the first fugitive slave law Act of February 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 
(amended 1850) (repealed 1864).  Virginia based its refusal to return the kidnappers on states’ rights arguments. 
 
15 Paul Finkelman, States' Rights, Federalism, and Criminal Extradition in Antebellum America:  The New York-
Virginia Controversy, 1839-1846, in GERMAN AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT: CONTEXTS, INTERACTION, 
AND HISTORICAL REALITIES 293-327 (Hermann Wellenreuther, ed., 1990); Paul Finkelman, States Rights North and 
South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 
125-58 (1989) [hereinafter Finkelman, Antebellum]; Paul Finkelman, The Protection of Black Rights in Seward's New 
York , 34 CIV. WAR HIST. 211-34 (1988) [hereinafter Finkelman, Black Rights]. 
 
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 
17 See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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understand something about the legal badges of slavery imposed by the states and by the U.S. Supreme 
Court during the antebellum period?  Similarly, an understanding of slavery and slave law can shed light 
on the goals of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Less obvious is the way the 
history of slavery and the Constitution can help explain the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the problem of incorporation.18   The suppression of abolitionist speech in 
the South and the arbitrary arrests of free blacks entering slave states, which are both part of the legal 
and constitutional history of slavery, can shed much light on this issue and can help us understand the 
evolution of First Amendment freedoms in the 19th century. 
This history may also be useful for helping us to understand the constitutional right to travel.  In 
Saenz v. Roe,19 the United States Supreme Court struck down a California statute that provided lower 
welfare payments for people who had recently moved into the state.  The Court in part relied on earlier 
cases protecting a "right to travel,"20 which is embedded in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV of the Constitution.  But, the Court also noted that this right grew and developed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that states give equal rights to recent migrants.   
The brief for the lead counsel representing Roe in this case,21 as well as the amicus briefs, cited 
                                                                               
 
18 Michael Kent Curtis, Teaching Free Speech from an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L. REV. (in this volume); 
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS , NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 26-56 (1986). 
 
19 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 
20 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 
U.S. 160 (1941); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
21 Brief of Respondents at 42, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (No. 98-97). 
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to a number of slavery cases and scholarly articles relating to the jurisprudence of slavery.22  They also 
discussed the actions taken by antebellum southern states to limit the right of abolitionists and free 
blacks to travel within their jurisdictions.23  These attorneys argued that a fundamental purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to reverse this history, and to allow free and open travel for all Americans. 
 The Court did not cite to this history or to the scholarly literature on the subject, but Justice John Paul 
Stevens, speaking for a seven-to-two majority, did cite to arguments by Congressman John Bingham on 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Stevens also noted that, in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,24 Chief Justice Taney denied that blacks could be citizens of the United States, or that they 
could claim privileges and immunities under the U.S. Constitution.25  The Fourteenth Amendment, of 
course, had been adopted in part to reverse Dred Scott.  Here, then, is an example of how the modern 
court uses the jurisprudence of slavery to help explain the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment for 
our own time. 
4.  Proslavery constitutional theory affected the development of the Constitution in a variety of 
ways.  In the 1820s and 1830s, opponents of the restriction on slavery in the Missouri Compromise 
argued that the Compromise unconstitutionally denied southerners access to the territories with their 
constitutionally protected property.  By 1857, a majority of the Supreme Court accepted this theory, 
                         
22 Brief of Catholic Charities USA et al., Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at 12, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999) (No. 98-97); Brief for William Cohen et al., supporting Respondents at 3-8, 23-24, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999) (No. 98-97). 
23 See infra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D. S.C. 1823) (No. 
4366)). 
24 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857). 
25 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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articulating it in Dred Scott v. Sandford.  An example of the connection of slavery to the evolution of 
Constitutional law can be seen in the extreme response to McCulloch v. Maryland by some southern 
nationalists.  In 1820, in response to McCulloch, the Virginia politician and lawyer, John Taylor of 
Caroline, published Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated.  Taylor was a cranky, 
hardline Jeffersonian states' rights southern legal theorist who hated the Bank of the United States, the 
growing power of the national government, and Chief Justice Marshall's expansive nationalist opinion.  
He considered Madison and Monroe to be virtual traitors to their states and to the Jeffersonian Party.  
Taylor ended his attack on McCulloch with the argument that, if Congress could create a Bank under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, then it could end slavery in the states under the same power. 
 It is hard to see the logic of that argument, even in the modern era.  It must have seemed 
extreme in the early 19th century as well.  But, Taylor's argument illustrates both how fearful 
slaveowners were about the growth of federal power and the way in which slavery could shape 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Especially after Roger B. Taney became Chief Justice, the Court began to 
take seriously the theories and ideas of men like Taylor. 
 Consider, for example, Mayor of New York v. Miln,26 which the Court decided in 1837, 
during Taney's first year as Chief Justice.  On the surface, the case involved the regulation of migrants.  
At issue was a New York law requiring all vessels docking in New York City to provide a list of 
passengers and to post security against these passengers from becoming public charges.  Miln, the 
master of the ship Emily, had not done so and the city sought to collect the statutory penalty for his 
failure to file the report.  Miln argued that the state had no power to pass such a law because it violated 
7
Finkelman: Teaching Slavery in Constitutional Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 
 8 
the Commerce Clause, which vested in the Congress all powers over interstate and foreign commerce.  
Justice Philip J. Barbour, whom Jackson had named to the Court at the same time as Justice Taney, 
avoided the Commerce Clause argument and instead invoked, for the first time, what later came to be 
called the state police power doctrine -- the right of a sovereign to take all necessary steps to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. A state, according to Justice Barbour, is competent "to 
provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly 
convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious 
articles imported . . . ."27   While it is not apparent at first glance, the subtext of the decision in Miln was 
the growing sectional tension over slavery and the rights of free blacks.  If New York could not regulate 
immigrants, then states like South Carolina could not regulate free blacks or slaves who might be 
brought into the state.  Thus, in the 1830s, proslavery constitutional theory affected the development of 
constitutional law, even in cases that were not about slavery. 
5.  Finally, the heritage and memory of slavery remain potent forces in American society.  
Slavery is a profoundly painful aspect of American history that resonates deeply with Americans.  
Understanding the way slavery shaped the writing and development of the Constitution gives students a 
broader sense of the relationship among law, public policy, and social realities.  Try as we might in the 
last half-century, Americans have been incapable of overcoming race; creating a color-blind 
Constitution that fosters racial equality and a color-blind society; or eliminating race as a profoundly 
                                                                               
26 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
27 Id. at 142-43. 
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important factor in criminal justice.28  Less obviously, race is a factor in immigration law,29 welfare 
policies,30 and foreign policy.31  In training new lawyers, we create not only courtroom practitioners, but 
also attorneys who will end up in all types of positions in government, business, and policy-making.  We 
must make sure that these lawyers understand the way race has shaped American law for more than 
two centuries.  The great black scholar, W.E.B. DuBois, proved to be prophetic in predicting that the 
problem of the 20th century would be the color line.32  Only by understanding how deeply race has 
been a constitutional issue for us can we hope to remove the "color line" as the fundamental issue for the 
21st century.   
II.  FINDING SLAVERY IN MOST CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURSES AND CASEBOOKS 
Despite the obvious importance of slavery to American constitutional history, and other legal 
developments,33 slavery is virtually absent from Constitutional Law classes.  The reasons for this are 
                         
28 See, e.g., Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2128 (1989).  
 
29 See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of 
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).  See also  Gabriel J. Chin, The First Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just 
How Great was “The Great Dissenter?,” 32 AKRON L. REV. 629, 631 (1999).  See also  Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 
178, 190 (1922); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 207 (1923); 
30 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489. 
31 Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American 
Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (1997); RACE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE 
PRESENT (Michael L. Krenn ed. 1998). 
32 W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 13 (1904) ("The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the 
Color Line."). 
33 Slavery might also be profitably integrated into other law school subjects.  Some property casebooks now 
incorporate slavery to a greater extent than constitutional law books.  One text  in particular contains a nice section on 
"Property in Persons," which includes excerpts from Dred Scott v. Sandford .  See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 
LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES  1326-41 (2d ed. 1997).  However, this section is placed at the very end of the 
book, along with a section on "Indian Human Remains," and many courses will never get to that part of the book.  
RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES AND MATERIALS IN PROPERTY 1075-1103 (2d ed. 1999) also contains a substantial section 
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complex.  Most law professors, like most other Americans, are uncomfortable with our slaveholding 
past, and for lawyers especially, it may be particularly difficult to deal with something that seems so 
aberrant to the nature of American law.  For example, the late Professor Harry Kalven "could not 
understand how a system as good as American law could have supported an institution as evil as 
slavery."34  Kalven struggled with the problem, and along with Owen Fiss and Stanley N. Katz, 
pioneered the teaching of a course on the law of slavery at the University of Chicago School of Law.  
Similar courses are now taught at many law schools, and many legal scholars have increasingly come to 
accept that slavery mattered in the development of American constitutional law.35  These courses, 
however, are discrete and specialized offerings in legal history, jurisprudence, or race relations.  In 
required courses, such as Constitutional Law, slavery remains virtually unseen and unmentioned.  
Some casebook authors seem to be unaware that slavery played a significant role in American 
constitutional law.  The addition of Kathleen Sullivan to Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law36 
casebook has not changed the book's stubborn resistance, over 13 editions, to acknowledging that 
slavery was even a factor – much less a critical factor – in the development of American constitutional 
law.  The book mentions Dred Scott three times, but does not have any text from the case.  The word 
"slavery" is in the index, but the references are to post-Civil War cases. The book has no reference to 
                                                                               
on slavery.  J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND MATERIALS 28-30 (1998) 
has a very tiny discussion of slavery and a brief excerpt from Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). 
 
34 Stanley N. Katz, Opening Address, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1996). 
 
35 Illustrative of the growing interest in slavery and the law are recent symposium issues of the Chicago-Kent Law 
Review, the Cardozo Law Review, and a symposium on race and affirmative action in the Akron Law Review. See 
Symposium, The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 325 (1994); Symposium, Opening Address, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1689 (1996); Symposium, Reflections on Law and Race, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423 (1999). 
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any other cases involving slavery.  Oddly, many professors use this book because it is "encyclopedic."  
Its reputation as "encyclopedic" leads to a kind of circular logic that tends to underscore the belief that 
slavery is irrelevant to our constitutional development.  After all, if there are no slave cases in an 
"encyclopedic" casebook, then slavery must be unimportant.  
Like Gunther and Sullivan, Jerome Barron and his co-authors have managed to avoid any 
mention of slavery through five editions of their casebook,37 as have William B. Lockhart and his co-
authors in the eight editions of their book.38  The same is true for Ronald Rotunda's casebook, which is 
now in its sixth edition.39  In some of these books, Dred Scott is mentioned in a footnote, or even in an 
excerpt of a dissenting opinion, but no text of the case appears anywhere and there is not even a note 
discussing it.  Daniel Farber and his colleagues have a nice three-page discussion of slavery and the 
Constitution in their narrative introduction to constitutional developments, but they provide no cases on 
slavery.  The term "slavery" in the index directs the reader to a seven-page section of the book, but it 
turns out that this section is an edited version of the Civil Rights Cases,40 decided eighteen years after 
the end of slavery.41  Discussions of this issue on a con-law listserv suggest that a smattering of 
professors using these books supplement the texts with an excerpt from Dred Scott or some other slave 
                                                                               
36 GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed. 1997). 
 
37 JEROME BARRON, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (5th ed. 1996). 
 
38 WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES  (8th ed. 1996). 
 
39 RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  CASES AND NOTES  (6th ed. 2000). 
 
40 Civil Rights Cases,109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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case, or integrate a little of slave law into their courses in some other way.42 
A few casebooks do slightly better.  Norman Redlich, the late Bernard Schwartz, and John 
Attanasio have a four-page note on Dred Scott v. Sandford, although they make no attempt to provide 
an edited version of the case.43  Donald Lively and his colleagues offer a ten-page section on slavery as 
an introduction to the materials on civil rights.44  This section includes a short excerpt from Chief Justice 
Roger B. Taney's angry concurrence in Prigg v. Pennsylvania45 and a longer excerpt from  Dred 
Scott.  Most other casebooks are similarly bereft of material on slavery.  Similarly, in American 
Constitutional Law, Louis Fisher, who has a political science and public policy background, provides 
a section on "Racial Discrimination" that contains nine pages on slavery, including four and a half pages 
on Dred Scott v. Sandford.46  His narrative mentions two other cases, Ableman v. Booth47 and Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania,48 although only minimally describing what the cases were about.49   
The influence of Mark Tushnet, an important scholar of slavery,50 is obvious in Constitutional 
                         
42 Self-servingly, I should note that some Constitutional Law professors supplement their courses with a small 
paperback book containing a scholarly introduction to this case and an edited version of the Dred Scott decision.  
See PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (1997) [hereinafter PAUL 
FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT]. 
 
43 NORMAN REDLICH ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 618-22 (3d ed. 1996). 
 
44 See generally DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND DIALOGUES (2d ed. 2000). 
 
45 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 626 (1842). 
 
46 LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 853-62 (3d ed. 1999). 
 
47 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858). 
 
48 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 
49 FISHER, supra  note 46, at 853-62. 
 
50 MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860 (1981). 
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Law edited by Geoffrey Stone and three others, including Tushnet.51  The book begins its section on 
race discrimination with ten pages on slavery, including four pages on Dred Scott and a bit on State v. 
Post,52 a relatively obscure New Jersey case that seems oddly placed in the book.  The book also 
contains some note material on slavery, including two paragraphs on Prigg, which raise some significant 
issues about the case.  The book does not, however, explore the way in which important slave cases 
like Prigg and Dred Scott had a jurisprudential impact that went beyond slavery. 
Sandford Levinson, who has a Ph.D. in political science, has long argued that slavery should be 
incorporated into the canon of constitutional law.53  His two articles on the subject even suggest how to 
teach slavery in a Constitutional Law class.  This influence is apparent in Process of Constitutional 
Decisionmaking, which he co-authors with Paul Brest and others.54  Much of the direction of his course 
is jurisprudential, and slavery becomes a vehicle for getting at difficult theoretical questions.  Thus he 
argues, as I have in my own work,55 that Dred Scott is an example of original-intent jurisprudence.  The 
use of originalism in Dred Scott might make any scholar or jurist wary of such an approach.  Levinson is 
also concerned with issues of professionalism and professional responsibility, and slavery is helpful for 
                                                                               
 
51 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996). 
 
52 State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. (1 Spencer) 368 (1845). 
 
53 Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1087 (1993); Sanford 
Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, in SLAVERY AND THE LAW 89-112 (Paul Finkelman, ed., 1997). 
 
54 PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000). 
 
55 PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT, supra  note 42; Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: 
The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT L. REV. 349 (1989). 
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raising questions in this area of the law as well.56 
When I am wearing my "legal history hat," I can make a strong case for slavery as a separate 
topic -- the Brest and Levinson approach.57  This approach, however, is inherently problematic because 
of the way most professors teach Constitutional Law.  Few Constitutional Law classes are taught 
topically, thus it is hard to figure out how to fit slavery into the course as a separate topic, unless one 
uses it to make ethical or jurisprudential points.  The Brest and Levinson approach, which is the best so 
far in any casebook, also isolates slavery by making it a separate chapter that is not a specifically "legal" 
or "constitutional" chapter.  I can understand the reasons for having slavery as a separate topic, but I 
think that this approach has the danger of signaling to the student that slavery was not really part of 
American constitutional law.  Rather, it was something that happened apart from American constitutional 
law.  Equally important, by separating slavery from other parts of the casebook, we mislead students 
into thinking that the origins of some precedents does not matter.  In fact, I think it is important to 
demonstrate that some precedents, and some jurisprudential lines of thinking, developed out of slavery 
and may still be used to maintain inequality, even though slavery itself was "purged" from the 
Constitution when the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted. 
At most schools, Constitutional Law is divided into two parts:  the first part, Con Law I, is 
universally required, and covers judicial review; separation of powers; the Commerce Clause; the 
                         
56 For other considerations of slavery and legal ethics, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves:  The Anthony Burns Case, Judge 
Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1793 (1996); Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law 
of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 75 (1999). 
 
57 BREST, supra  note 54, which appeared after I first presented this paper at a conference at the University of Akron 
School of Law, has also begun to integrate material on slavery into other parts of the book, such as the Commerce 
Clause, where the editors show how slavery affected interstate commerce and Supreme Court rulings. 
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powers of Congress and the executive; and perhaps substantive due process.  It is taught neither 
chronologically, nor by subject.  The sections of the course are jurisprudential and doctrinal.  Thus, 
"slavery" as a subject, does not easily fit into such a course.  The contrast with other cases would be 
apparent to students.  We do not teach a section on banks and the Constitution, but rather we teach 
McCulloch v. Maryland58 as part of a discussion of the Supremacy Clause.  Similarly, we have no 
section on steamboats or bridges, but we use Gibbons v. Ogden59 or Charles River Bridge Company 
v. Warren Bridge Company60 to teach about the Commerce Clause or the Contracts Clause.  Thus, if 
we teach slavery as a separate section in Con Law I, it will appear to some students as a non-legal 
topic, rather than a topic that is part of the mainstream of American law. 
Equally important, most Constitutional Law teachers feel pressed to get through so much 
material in such a short time.  How can we possibly add more cases and more subjects when we can 
barely cover the standard canon, and keep up with the latest twists and turns of the Supreme Court?  
Ironically, while law is a field that is inherently historical -- based on precedent with jurists looking at 
legislative histories and original intent -- most law teachers feel a compulsion to focus on what is new, 
what happened today, or at least what happened yesterday.  Slavery, as a "dead" field of law, seems to 
have no place in the curriculum, except as an appendage.  The danger of this approach is that we teach 
modern cases in an area such as federalism without showing how these cases are rooted in slavery, 
states' rights arguments to protect slavery, and post-bellum racism.  It is worth pointing out that the 
                                                                               
 
58 McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 
59 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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modern Supreme Court seems to have resurrected notions of federalism and limitations on federal 
commerce power that grew out of slavery.  In some cases, these jurisprudential theories have been used 
to trump the Fourteenth Amendment, including section five of that Amendment, which seemed to 
empower Congress to overcome the pernicious effects of racism.  Thus, the equality principles of the 
Civil War Amendments (especially the Fourteenth) are limited by the antebellum interpretations of 
federalism that were developed to prevent equality. 
Slave cases are also unlikely to be considered in Con Law I because, when they are found in 
casebooks, as they are in Fisher, Brest and Levinson, or Stone, et al., they are segregated from the 
main development of the law and are usually found in the section on race discrimination and equal 
protection.  To integrate a slave case into the main flow of Con Law I would require skipping from one 
section to another, or assigning some cases out of order and out of the organizational structure of the 
casebook.   
Con Law II, often called civil liberties or civil rights, is taught in most law schools, sometimes as 
a required course, but often (and unfortunately) as an elective.  Thus, it is possible to get a law degree 
without ever reading a case on freedom of expression or racial discrimination.  Astoundingly, students 
can get through some law schools without encountering such central cases as Brown v. Board of 
Education,61 Abrams v. United States,62 New York Times Company v. Sullivan,63 or Roe v. 
                                                                               
60 Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
 
61 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 
62 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 
63 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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Most casebooks that do deal with slavery place it in this section of the book.  Certainly it is 
important to consider slavery here.  Slavery serves as a critical background for understanding equal 
protection jurisprudence.  When I teach Con Law II, I usually begin the section on civil rights with 
Prigg and Dred Scott, as well as some background on the Constitutional Convention and slavery.65  It 
is impossible for me to think of how one would teach about the Fourteenth Amendment, either in the 
19th century or in the 20th, without discussions of slavery, especially Dred Scott.  The absence of any 
discussion of slavery in the Gunther and Sullivan book and in other books seems to be fundamentally 
wrong-headed. 
Without seeing the antebellum jurisprudence in all its horror, we cannot possibly understand the 
purpose of the Civil War Amendments or the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which led to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In order for us to come to grips with the development of our constitutional history -- and 
indeed with constitutional jurisprudence -- and to "understand how a system as good as American law 
could have supported an institution as evil as slavery,"66 we must expose students to the nature of 
constitutional law under slavery.  Similarly, as I already noted, cases involving slavery are vital in 
teaching the meaning of civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
                         
64 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  During his confirmation hearings Justice Clarence Thomas claimed he did not 
read or think about Roe in law school.  Some of his detractors questioned the credibility of this statement, but given 
the nature of legal education in the United States, this is entirely possible. 
 
65 Self-servingly I assign my own book, which provides a very good introduction to the problem of slavery and race.  
See FINKELMAN DRED SCOTT, supra  note 42.  For a course on race and the law, I begin with FINKELMAN, SLAVERY, 
supra  note 4. 
 
66 Katz, supra  note 34, at 1690. 
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An analogy here to other aspects of constitutional law might be helpful.  Some Constitutional 
Law professors and many students wonder why we should spend much time, or any time, on the "dead 
law" of slavery.  But, of course, we spend a great deal of time on "dead law" in other parts of 
Constitutional Law.  Dred Scott and Prigg are no more "dead" than are Plessy v. Ferguson,67 United 
States v. E. C. Knight,68 Lochner v. New York,69 Hammer v. Dagenhart,70 Whitney v. 
California,71 or Dennis v. United States,72 all of which have been reversed.  We teach these cases to 
show how and why they were reversed.  But, too often, law professors start their discussion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment without a serious investigation of what it reversed.  Similarly, I assign -- as I 
think many law professors do -- the dissent in Abrams v. United States73 and the concurrence in 
Whitney for the elegance of the language and the importance of the jurisprudential theories propounded 
by Justices Holmes and Brandeis.  Surely it is also useful to use Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Dred Scott 
v. Sandford to show students the perversity of slavery and its pernicious effect on the way United 
States Supreme Court justices thought.   
III.  INTEGRATING SLAVERY INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURSE 
While it is critical to teach slavery as a prelude to understanding the Equal Protection, Privileges 
                         
67 Plessy v. Ferguson,163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 
68 United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 
69 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 
70 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 
71 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 
72 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 
73 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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and Immunities, and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, in teaching slavery we need to 
go a step further and begin to integrate slave cases into the general sweep of Constitutional Law.   
Right now, slavery sits either as an introduction to race discrimination, or as a separate topic, 
disconnected from the rest of Constitutional Law.  This disconnectedness is misleading.  Students fail to 
see how much of the Constitution's structure and development was influenced by slavery.  Components 
of the Constitution, such as the electoral college, the ban on export taxes, and even the Tenth 
Amendment, were shaped by slavery.74   Similarly, 19th century jurisprudence on commerce and state 
police powers was shaped by slavery.  The constitutional jurisprudence of slavery clearly affected 
judicial review, separation of powers, the Commerce Clause, state police powers, the Tenth 
Amendment, and the powers of Congress and the President.  Thus, many cases and other materials 
involving slavery might be profitably integrated into American legal education, and not segregated into a 
special section of the course or casebook.  Unfortunately, however sensible it would be to teach slavery 
as part of the development of the Commerce Clause or state police powers, the existing casebooks 
make this difficult.  However, it would be possible to demonstrate the importance of slavery and racism 
in the development of jurisprudence in this area by strategically placing a few headnotes and integrating 
a few lines in cases that are often edited out of the casebooks.   
Briefly, the following are some of the ways this sort of integration might take place.  This 
discussion is meant to be suggestive, rather than comprehensive.  My goal is to suggest ways of 
integrating cases involving slavery into the mainstream of Constitutional Law.  In doing so, we can see -- 
and teach our students -- that slavery was not an aberration in American constitutional development; 
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that slavery should not be seen as a separate topic that is outside of traditional constitutional categories. 
 Rather, I would argue, slavery was a driving engine of American constitutional law -- just as it was a 
key factor in the writing of the Constitution itself -- and that much of our modern constitutional law 
directly evolved out of these slave cases.   
We teach Marbury to introduce judicial review.  Perhaps we should pair it with Dred Scott, the 
only other antebellum case in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a federal statute.  
The case is instructive, because in Dred Scott the Court struck down a major statute, which had been in 
force for 37 years, or more than half of the time the nation had operated under the Constitution.  The 
case and its aftermath allow us to teach some important aspects of constitutional development, including 
the way in which a Supreme Court decision can have disastrous political and constitutional ramifications 
and that one answer to a Supreme Court opinion can be a constitutional amendment.  Dred Scott 
provides a “counter story" to Marbury.  In Marbury, students learn how a smart (clever?  brilliant?) 
Chief Justice outsmarted a president, solved a dilemma, and created a great and useful precedent.  The 
message of Marbury is that judicial review is painless, and that striking down a federal statute is easy 
and has no cost.  Dred Scott tells a different story. 
Dred Scott is also important for teaching the development of substantive due process.  With the 
exception of one New York case,75  Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott is the first use of substantive 
due process.  Taney argued that the ban on slavery in the Missouri Compromise amounted to a "taking" 
under the Fifth Amendment.  Indeed, this case can perhaps be seen as the earliest example of the 
                                                                               
74 See Finkelman, Affirmative Action, supra  note 4 at 428; FINKELMAN, SLAVERY, supra  note 4. 
75 Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
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takings jurisprudence that is so popular with the current Supreme Court.76   When we teach Dred Scott, 
we might compare it to some of the modern takings cases, and ask if banning slavery from an area might 
not be similar to an environmental regulation that is designed to save an endangered beach.   
Of course, it is possible to argue that Dred Scott is not a problematic use of the takings 
doctrine.  One might argue that it is even a correct use of the doctrine -- because the Constitution did 
protect slavery and therefore a statute (the Missouri Compromise) which arbitrarily takes property 
away from someone is unconstitutional.  However, we might also argue that the ban on slavery in the 
territories was not arbitrary because it did not lead to a traditional "taking" of private property.  Instead, 
it prohibited bringing a particular product into the territories that was banned for a good reason.  
Slaveowners had ample notice that they could not bring slaves into the region.  In that sense, the ban on 
slavery might look like a modern environmental regulation that prohibits boats, automobiles, guns, or 
even pets in certain areas.  Nor was the ban on slavery a "taking" for "public use" in any normal sense of 
the term.  Under such an argument, the substantive due process analysis was not legitimately applied. 
Slavery had a strong impact on the development of the constitutional recognition of the police 
powers of states, which emerged in Mayor of New York v. Miln,77 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens 
of Philadelphia,78 and The Passenger Cases.79  In Miln, counsel argued that the regulation of 
                         
76 See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 376 (1994). 
 
77 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 107 (1837). 
 
78 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
 
79 See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
 
21
Finkelman: Teaching Slavery in Constitutional Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 
 22 
immigrants was similar to state laws banning the African slave trade before the federal ban in 1808.80  
Implicit in these cases was the Supreme Court's recognition that the South had a special interest in 
protecting its slaves from the "corruption" of free blacks from other places.  Some of the opinions in 
these cases refer directly to the problem.  However, casebooks gloss over this matter or edit it out 
altogether.  Moreover, with the exception the newest edition of Brest and Levinson,81 no casebook 
mentions the origins of this problem.   
This issue first emerged in South Carolina, in the Circuit Court case of Elkison v. 
Deliesseline.82  The case involved an 1822 South Carolina statute -- known as a "black seamen's act" -
- which required the incarceration in the local jail of free black sailors who came into the state while 
serving on merchant ships.  Elkison, a British subject, turned to the federal courts when the local sheriff, 
Deliesseline, incarcerated him under this statute.  Justice William Johnson, while riding circuit, declared, 
in dicta, that the South Carolina law violated the Commerce Clause.  But, for procedural reasons, 
Johnson did not order Elkison's freedom.  Counsel for South Carolina argued that the state had as much 
right to "quarantine" free blacks as New York had to quarantine immigrants with diseases.  Tied to this 
issue were arguments about states’ rights, federal powers, federalism, and the Tenth Amendment.  All of 
this is tied up in the evolution of the Commerce Clause.  Without slavery, it is entirely possible that 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence on local control and police powers might never have developed, or 
                         
80 Miln, 36 U.S. at 111. 
 
81 BREST, supra  note 54, at 157-60.   
 
82 Elkison v. Deliesseine, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D. S.C. 1823) (No. 4366).  BREST, supra  note 54, at 157-59, is the only 
casebook I know of that mentions this case. 
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might have developed in an entirely different way.  Even the License Cases,83 which allowed for state 
bans on liquor, were affected by slavery to the extent that northerners and southerners alike recognized 
that banning certain commercial products from interstate commerce might be necessary for both the 
protection of the slave states and for the protection of the free states. 
Slavery is also important for the development of the dormant Commerce Clause and of the 
preemption doctrine.  Groves v. Slaughter,84 decided in 1841, contains important discussions about 
the nature of the dormant Commerce Clause.  The case involved the validity of a provision of the 
Mississippi Constitution which prohibited the importation of slaves as articles of commerce.  After 
purchasing and receiving slaves from Slaughter, Groves and others refused to honor their notes, claiming 
the sale was void under the Mississippi Constitution.  The Court concluded that this provision of the 
state constitution required legislative implementation, and without it, the provision could not bar the sale 
of slaves in Mississippi.  Thus, Groves was required to pay Slaughter.  In reaching this result, Justice 
Smith Thompson avoided the larger constitutional question of "whether this article of the constitution of 
Mississippi is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States."85 
Other members of the Supreme Court, however, could not restrain themselves from discussing 
this issue.  Justice John McLean offered a powerful articulation of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
which he was prepared to apply to other constitutional provisions as well:  "If a commercial power may 
be exercised by a state because it has not been exercised by Congress, the same rule must apply to 
                         
83 See Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). 
 
84 Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 452 (1841). 
 
85 Id. at 503. 
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other powers expressly delegated to the federal government."86  Fully articulating the modern language 
and theory of this rule, Justice McLean went on to declare:  "A power may remain dormant, though the 
expediency of its exercise has been fully considered.  It is often wiser and more politic to forbear, than 
to exercise a power."87   Justice McLean then made the distinction between federal powers and state 
"inspection and police laws."88  Justice McLean, a Supreme Court justice from Ohio who was opposed 
to slavery, articulated why the sale of slaves is not included in the dormant commerce power, and why 
the states, not Congress, must be free to prohibit traffic in slaves if they so choose.  Chief Justice Taney, 
a proslavery southerner, chimed in that the "power to regulate the traffic in slaves between the different 
states"89 is "exclusively with the several states."90  Justice Taney asserted that the states retain the power 
to determine if they want slaves brought within their jurisdictions, and on this point he and Justice 
McLean were in agreement.  It is not clear, however, if Justice Taney also believed Congress retains the 
power to absolutely ban the interstate sale of slaves.  Justice Taney refused to comment on the existence 
of a dormant commerce power, but then offered a discussion of why the issue was unlikely to arise.91  
The idea of a dormant Commerce Clause had appeared in a few other cases.  In Willson v. 
                                                                               
 
86 Id. at 504. 
 




89 Id. at 508. 
 
90 Groves, 40 U.S. at 508. 
 
91 Id. at 509-10. 
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Black Bird Creek Marsh Company,92 Chief Justice John Marshall held that Congress could have 
regulated the Black Bird Creek under its commerce power, but in the absence of such a statute, the 
state had the power to erect a dam over the creek.  Justice Marshall declared that this power was not 
"repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state."93  In effect, Justice Marshall either 
denied the existence of the dormant commerce power, or refused to apply it.  In Holmes v. Jennison,94 
the Supreme Court cited Black Bird Creek for the proposition that there was no dormant Commerce 
Clause issue.  Similarly, in Mayor of New York v. Miln95 Justice Thompson’s dissent mentions the 
dormant Commerce Clause, but does not seem to be based on that theory of law.  Thus, Justice 
McLean's assertion of the dormant commerce power in Groves may be the first time in which a justice 
asserted that such a power existed. 
The New York state decision in Lemmon v. The People96 also allows for an exploration of the 
meaning of interstate commerce, as well as that of interstate comity.  The case involved a slaveowner 
who brought eight slaves into New York City while on a trip from Virginia to Texas in 1852.  The most 
direct route for him was to go by steamboat from Virginia to New York and then take a direct 
steamboat to New Orleans.  The New York Court of Appeals declared that his slaves were free the 
moment he voluntarily brought them into the state.  The case never reached the U.S. Supreme Court, 
                         
92 Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 249 (1829). 
 
93 Id. at 252. 
 
94 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 592 (1840). 
 
95 Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). 
 
96 Lemmon v. The People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).  For a full analysis of Lemmon, see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT 
UNION:  SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981). 
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but as the dissenters on the New York Court of Appeals noted, this decision surely threatened the 
concept of national commerce.  In his concurrence in Dred Scott, Justice Samuel Nelson implied that 
the Court would not allow such jurisprudence.97  Lemmon, which was never resolved by the Supreme 
Court, allows students and teachers to contemplate the tension between local jurisdiction, police powers 
needs, and the more national goals articulated in the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV.98 
Even when the advocates of slavery lost, they helped shape constitutional law, especially 
Commerce Clause regulations.  In the Passenger Cases99 the Court, by a vote of five to four, struck 
down New York and Massachusetts statutes taxing ships that brought foreign immigrants into those 
states.  In eight opinions covering 180 pages, the Court ruled that the laws violated the Commerce 
Clause.  Justice Taney dissented, along with Peter V. Daniel of Virginia, Samuel Nelson of New York, 
and Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire.  All four justices were proslavery Democrats.  The dissenters 
undoubtedly felt that, in order to preserve the right of the Southern states to forbid free Negroes from 
entering their jurisdiction, the Court had to allow the Northern states to exclude undesirable aliens.  
Justice James Wayne, a slaveowner from Georgia, one of the majority justices, argued that the two had 
nothing to do with each other, but Levi Woodbury warned that one could not separate the categories: 
nationalism in commerce and states' rights in controlling blacks just were not compatible.  Southern 
newspapers for the most part agreed; whatever fine lines of legal reasoning may have existed in the 
                                                                               
 
97 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 468 (1857) (Nelson, J., concurring). 
 
98 The issues raised in Lemmon may arise in the future in cases involving interstate comity and same-sex marriage. 
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various opinions, Southern newspapers argued that the Black Seamen's Acts, which effectively 
prevented free northern blacks from entering southern ports, could hardly stand in the light of these 
cases.  According to the Charleston [S.C.] Mercury, the decision would "strip the South of all power 
of self-protection, and make submission to its rule equivalent to ruin and degradation."100  Thus, even in 
cases distant from slavery, there was constant pressure from proslavery constitutional theorists to 
minimize the commerce power while maximizing state police powers.  
From a modern perspective, the Passenger Cases seem open and shut; the states imposed 
taxes on immigrants, which clearly violated the Constitution's ban on state import taxes.  The state laws 
were clearly violation of federal Commerce Clause power.  But, southerners were ever vigilant in 
protecting the interests of slavery.  Even when they lost, as they did here, the extreme defenders of 
slavery scored important points by forcing the majority to write a narrow opinion and also to respect 
southern interests in subsequent cases.  
As far as I can determine, the first preemption case was probably Prigg v. Pennsylvania.  
That case involved the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's personal liberty law of 1826.  Under that law, 
claimants seeking to remove a fugitive slave from the state had to first apply for a certificate of removal 
from a state magistrate.  The purpose of the law was to prevent the kidnapping of free blacks in a state 
with a substantial free black population.  Implemented in good faith, the law would not have harmed the 
interests of most claimants of fugitive slaves, but would have cut down on the removal of free blacks 
                                                                               
99 See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
100 CHARLESTON MERCURY, Feb. 14, 1849, quoted in Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836-1864 in 5 OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  393 (1974). 
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wrongly or fraudulently claimed to be runaway slaves.   
The case began when Prigg and three other men sought to remove a black woman, Margaret 
Morgan, her husband Jerry Morgan, and their children, claiming them as runaway slaves from 
Maryland.  A York County magistrate refused to issue the proper certificate, in part because Morgan's 
status as a slave was suspect, and a least one of her children had been born in Pennsylvania and was 
clearly free under the law of that state.  In addition, Jerry Morgan himself had been born a free man in 
Pennsylvania.  Prigg and his cohorts then forcibly took Margaret and her children, but not Jerry, to 
Maryland.  Prigg was subsequently convicted of kidnapping by a Pennsylvania court. 
In striking down Pennsylvania's law, Justice Joseph Story argued that federal law preempted 
state action.  No state could add to what Congress had set out in the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793.  In 
dicta, Justice Story also implied that the Fugitive Slave Clause of the United States Constitution101 could 
function like the dormant Commerce Clause by asserting that, in the absence of any federal law, the 
Fugitive Slave Clause could still be used to strike down state laws that interfere with the return of 
fugitive slaves.  Thus, Prigg contains one of the earliest and most complete discussions of a "dormant" 
Congressional power.  It is the first time this issue is discussed in a majority opinion.  Justice Story 
argued that, in the absence of any federal law, the states could not legislate on this subject to the 
detriment of people claiming fugitive slaves.  Thus a "dormant fugitive slave power" existed, which 
prevented the states from creating barriers to the return of runaways. 
Prigg, an enormously rich case for constitutional doctrine and theory, also contains the first 
example of the modern notion of "unfunded mandates."  The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 authorized 
28




state magistrates to implement the law.  In his opinion, Justice Story concluded that state officials were 
free to enforce the law if they wished to do so, and that, in fact, they had a moral obligation to do so 
under the Constitution.  He further argued that the states were equally under a moral obligation to 
enforce the law.  But, because the federal government did not employ the state judges, Justice Story 
also agreed that the states could refuse to enforce the law.  That is, the federal government could not 
impose an unfunded mandate to enforce a federal law.  Thus, Justice Story suggested, "it might well be 
deemed an unconstitutional exercise in the power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to 
provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere delegated or entrusted 
to them by the Constitution."102  Thus, Prigg can be seen as the precursor of -- and most significant 
precedent for -- cases like New York v. United States103 and Printz v. United States.104 
The last of the antebellum slavery cases was Kentucky v. Dennison,105 decided in February of 
1861, just before Lincoln took office, and after a number of states had already left the Union.  The case 
involved an attempt by Kentucky to extradite a free black from Ohio who had been accused of helping 
a fugitive slave escape into Ohio.  Two Ohio governors, Salmon P. Chase and William Dennison, 
refused to comply with Kentucky's extradition requisition.  Both claimed that helping a slave escape was 
not a crime that Ohio recognized and therefore the alleged criminal could not be extradited.  On the eve 
                                                                               
101 U.S.CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3. 
102 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-16 (1842). 
 
103 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,178 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (“The Constitution simp ly does not give 
Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. . . .  Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause 
Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents."). 
 
104 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down the portion of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection 
Act that required state officials to implement the law). 
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of the Civil War, Chief Justice Taney agreed with Ohio.  He was obviously unsympathetic to the 
antislavery views of the Ohio governors, but he was anxious to avoid a precedent that would give the 
national government the power to force state governors to act.  The meaning of interstate extradition 
was contested throughout the antebellum period.106   Governors in New York, Maine, Illinois, and Ohio 
refused to authorize the extradition of people who were wanted in the South for offenses relating to 
slavery.  Governors in Georgia, Virginia, Missouri, and Kentucky bitterly complained about this.  But 
the ruling in Dennison confirmed that the Extradition Clause of Article IV gave the governors the power 
to protect fugitives from what might be deemed "injustice."  In the years after the Civil War, governors 
occasionally used their powers to protect fugitives, especially blacks escaping the injustice of the 
segregated South.   
In Puerto Rico v. Bransted,107 the Court reversed Dennison and removed one last opportunity 
for the states to work for greater social justice, and to protect people from prejudice in the legal system. 
 Bransted seems to be a sad misreading of the jurisprudence of slavery and a potentially catastrophic 
misunderstanding of the way antebellum federalism was occasionally used to protect minorities.  
Teaching these two cases might allow us to reclaim the positive heritage of the abolitionists, and remind 
our students that federalism was sometimes used to protect, rather than oppress, minorities, as was the 
case with most slavery jurisprudence.  Bransted also illustrates how impoverished our jurisprudence can 
become when the courts fail to seriously consider constitutional history. 
                                                                               
105 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
 
106 See Finkelman, Antebellum, supra  note 15, at 125-58; Finkelman, Black Rights, supra  note 15, at 211-34. 
 
107 Puerto Rico v. Bransted, 483 U.S. 219, 220 (1987). 
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IV.  SLAVERY AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
Integrating slavery into traditional Constitutional Law courses will be difficult.  It requires 
cramming more into a course that is already crammed with cases, theories, and arguments.  But the 
benefits of doing so will surely outweigh the costs.  Students will better understand the way the 
Constitution developed over time, and they will have a deeper sense of the way race has affected both 
constitutional law and American culture.  In that way, students will be better prepared for living and 
practicing law in an increasingly multicultural and multiracial American society.   
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